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BOOK REVIEW
THE LEGAL EDUCATION OF PLEA BARGAINING PARTICIPANTS
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS. By Milton Heumann. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. viii, 220. $15.00
For Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors,
Judges and Defense Attorneys, Milton Heumann sets a goal
modest enough, at least in its potential impact on the legal
system: "to explore the postrecruitment adaptation of new
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to the 'plea bargain
court.' "" He gathers material which will be valuable both to
those who participate daily in the plea bargaining process and
to non-participants who continue to critically evaluate the pro-
cess. Not only does Heumann present information which indi-
cates that plea bargaining is not a function of case pressure, a
view which challenges accepted notions of the source and the
process of plea bargaining; he also presents information which
challenges the prevailing mode of legal education as prepara-
tion for the practice of law. He reports that beginning prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys are surprised at what they discover
upon entering the practice of law, and that because their legal
education does not prepare them adequately for what they en-
counter, a reeducation is essential in adjusting to the realities
of the profession.
Although in places Plea Bargaining could be read to imply
a critique of the criminal justice system or an indictment of
legal education, it is, in addition, a much needed description
of the reality of criminal courts. Heumann's focus is the crimi-
nal courts of Connecticut in 1972, yet his description probably
is equally accurate for the entire criminal justice system even
today. A close reading of this book will disclose the dichotomy
*- Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii Law School. B.B.A. 1967,
M.B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of Michigan.
IM. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE ExPERIENcEs OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as M. HEUNANN].
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between the theory and the practice of law as seen through the
eyes of lawyers who work in the courts.
RESEARCH AND THE ADAPTATION PROCESS
Heumann's research spanned a period of eight months,
beginning in July, 1972, while he was a graduate student at
Yale University. Plea Bargaining is derived essentially from
interviews conducted during this period with seventy-one pros-
ecutors, defense attorneys and judges of Connecticut courts,
focusing upon the topic of plea bargaining. The numerous in-
terview excerpts, ranging from fascinating to tedious, are nec-
essary steps in the documentation of what actually happens in
the adaptation process.
The real substance of Plea Bargaining is contained in four
chapters on "adaptation," including a chapter in which Heu-
mann considers adaptation in a general context and one chap-
ter each in which he explores the specific adaptation processes
for defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges. For purposes of
this study of the adaptation of newcomers-people with less
than one year of experience-to the criminal justice system,
Heumann defines "adaptation" as "the process in which a
newcomer in the criminal justice system learns and is taught
about his role obligations, and the related process in which he
translates these obligations into a perspective on plea bargain-
ing." 2
Heumann develops two components which determine the
process of adaptation: "teaching," which refers to "the use of
rewards and sanctions by others in the court system to direct
newcomer behavior down a particular path," 3 and "learning,"
which refers to "the newcomer's discovery that the reality of
the local criminal court differs from what he expected."'4 He
views "learning," the developing perception of the contrast
between the theory and the practice of law, as being at the
heart of newcomer adaptation. Believing that many people who
have critiqued the plea bargaining system have failed to con-
sider the "learning" component, he concludes, not unexpect-
2 Id, at 2.
3Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 2-3.
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edly, that they also have failed to fully understand the motiva-
tions of the plea bargainers. His research will be a valuable aid
to a better understanding of how people are functioning in the
plea bargaining process and for formulating and evaluating
policy recommendations about plea bargaining.5
Heumann's study dovetails with and completes the pic-
ture of all participants in Connecticut's criminal courts begun
by Jonathan Casper in 1972.6 Casper's research, which concen-
trates on information derived from interviews conducted with
defendants in the Connecticut criminal justice system, 7 pro-
vides an instructive complement to Heumann's analysis. Al-
though Heumann intentionally excluded from his study defen-
dants' impressions of the plea bargaining system, input from
defendants would have been useful as a reference point from
which to judge the subjectivity of the comments of his subject
participants. Subsequent researchers may combine and com-
pare Heumann's and Casper's findings for a complete picture
of the adaptation process as it existed in Connecticut in 1972.
However, it is important to warn that the attorneys and judges
studied by Heumann seemed to de-emphasize the defendant as
a participant in the plea bargaining process. "It's simply a
matter that three reasonable men-the judge, the prosecutor,
and the defense attorney-concur," said one judge.8 The de-
fense attorneys shared this personal perspective, reporting that
they felt lost, confused, uneasy, surprised, distressed and inef-
fective, but making no comments about what happened to
their first clients or the quality of representation provided such
clients. This perspective may qualify Heumann's conclusion
The potential impact of this study of newcomers can be placed in perspective
by realizing that America's criminal justice system is controlled by lawyers with two
or less years of experience. Plea Bargaining Is Rarely Eliminated, 64 A.B.A. J. 1334,
1335 (1978).
' See J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE (1972)
[hereinafter cited as J. CASPER].
Both Heumann and Casper conducted 71 interviews in Connecticut courts for
their respective studies; both were at Yale University at the time; both thanked each
other for assistance in the introductions to their respective books. Casper has con-
ducted another study of 900 defendants in Pheonix, Baltimore and Detroit. See J.
CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE (1978).
M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 151.
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"that plea bargaining benefits most defendants,"9 and lend
credence to the sentiment of defendants interviewed by Casper
that, at best, they "lose less."' 0
Critical to evaluating Heumann's research, or any analytic
project relying in part on first-hand interview material, are two
questions: (1) whether the interviewer asked the right ques-
tions, and (2) whether the interviewer developed a coherent
and meaningful interpretation of the assembled answers. Since
the reader of Plea Bargaining is not presented with all the
answers to the interviewer's questions, it is impossible to an-
swer the latter question. The first question, however, can be
answered with a general "yes" because the reader knows what
Heumann was seeking" through the topics covered in the inter-
views: adaptation to the job, court operations, career goals and
rewards and sanctions.'2 The only significant defect is the fail-
ure to ask more directly about the relationship between case
pressure and plea bargaining.'3
As a true social scientist, Heumann expressed concern over
the validity of his conclusions due to problems in data collec-
tion and in the uniqueness of the particular jurisdiction tested.
For example, since only fifteen of the seventy-one people inter-
viewed were actually "newcomers," most of his information
was provided by experienced veterans. Although the use of so
many veterans raises the question of whether they recall their
adaptation process objectively,'" the subjective perceptions of
these participants are extremely important. Furthermore, it
should be kept in mind that Connecticut is somewhat unique
'Id. at 84.
J0 j. CASPER, supra note 6, at 78.
" Heumann's research "tips" may be useful to others who undertake similar
studies. M. HEUANN, supra note 1, at 14-17.
12 Id. at 18.
13 Only the prosecutors seem to have been asked directly about this relationship.
Id. at 114-16. The question is not raised in the chapter on defense attorneys. It is
treated obliquely in the chapter on judges. Id. at 144-48.
Other subjects that might affect plea bargaining are ignored. For example, in a
set of case files for 88 defendants, Heumann found that 76 of them had more than one
charge against them, the average being four charges, but he never asked prosecutors
or defense attorneys about over-charging as an inducement to plea bargaining. Id. at
42.
14 "The reality of the system presumably varies from perspective to perspective."
J. CASPER, supra note 6, at 72.
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because trial judges rotate among circuits and appoint the
prosecutors and public defenders. While such factors may raise
questions as to whether the study is statistically significant for
social science purposes or is typical of court patterns in other
jurisdictions, the results are probably no less (and perhaps
more) accurate than the generalizations and gestalt impression
that the legally-trained audience has been accustomed to re-
ceiving in legal journalism.'5 Heumann's study clearly supports
the growing and important tradition of ground-floor level anal-
ysis,16 which focuses on practice at its root, or bottom opera-
tional level, as contrasted with the image derived from theory.
This ground-floor approach is a prerequisite to a full under-
standing of the legal system.
Case Pressure Hypothesis
A considerable portion of Plea Bargaining is devoted to
refuting the widely accepted notion that plea bargaining is a
function of case pressure. Empirical analysis, not the inter-
view, is the principal tool used for this task. After collecting
and analyzing data reflecting the percentage of trials in rela-
tion to total dispositions in Connecticut's Superior Courts from
1800 to 1954 and 1966 to 1973 (the absence of data from 1954
to 1966 is never explained), Heumann concludes that the small
percentage of trials "is not a recent phenomenon." Trials very
seldom exceeded ten percent of total dispositions. This con-
stant historical pattern, while perhaps not startling, is one sel-
dom mentioned in plea bargaining literature. Heumann's anal-
ysis is excellent to this point, but then he leaps forward and
makes unwarranted assumptions about case pressure, based on
his knowledge of case volume. These assumptions, while neces-
sary to prove the point that plea bargaining is not a function
of case pressure, leave his empirical analysis on precarious
ground, even for those lawyers who are likely to apply less
15 "My interviews did not follow a set format, and the resulting study is not a
scientific survey; it is a kind of legal journalism." Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 52 (1968).
11 For a further explanation of ground-floor level analysis, see Barkai, Lower Crim-
inal Courts: The Perils of Procedure, 69 J. CraM. L. 270, 278 nn. 41 & 42 (1978) and
accompanying text. An example of this tradition is Mileski, Courtroom Encounters:
An Observational Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAw & Soc. REv. 473 (1971).
[Vol. 68
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severe empirical standards than his fellow social scientists.
Heumann simply equates case volume with case pressure and
then continues his analysis. However, he does pause to admit
that the equivalency is at best "rough" and that he "cannot be
sure that volume reflects pressure. 1' 7 The caveat, while percep-
tive, is largely understated. His assumption cuts deeply into
the support for his conclusion. Case pressure, in my mind, is
case volume in relationship to court personnel, including prose-
cutors, defense attorneys and judges, and the time available for
processing the cases.18 Volume and pressure simply are not
equivalent.
Heumann posits a second theory to explain the relation-
ship between case pressure and trials. Because of a change in
the circuit court's jurisdiction, the annual case volume was
reduced by nearly one-half between July 1970 and June 1973.
Since the percentage of trials remained relatively constant
while personnel levels remained unchanged, Heumann con-
cludes that case pressure is irrelevant. However, he does not
consider that during this relatively short period of time the
personnel might have continued to seek plea bargains at their
old frequency for other reasons, such as a desire for more leisure
time or a continuation of behavioral custom. Heumann's re-
ported interviews do not seem to explore possible behavioral
reasons as to why the frequency might have remained the same
during the short run.
A REAL LEGAL EDUCATION
Heumann's study of newcomer adaptation indicates that
the newcomer's expectations do not survive well in the criminal
justice system when confronted with its reality. New prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys begin their jobs with a
"presumption of trial"-expecting many trials with legally and
factually disputed issues." Heumann traces their adaptation to
' M. HEUMMN, supra note 1, at 28.
,S For example, if Court A had 20 cases and two prosecutors, and Court B had 40
cases and 10 prosecutors, Court B has greater case volume, but the prosecutors in Court
A would feel greater case pressure because they are responsible for more cases per
person.
11 For an explanation of the difference between "legal" and "factual" guilt, see
Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries For All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas
1979-80]
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a point where they are functioning with a "presumption of plea
* bargaining." He eventually concludes that they learn that ap-
proximately ninety percent of defendants are actually guilty,
that a sizable percentage of these have no substantial ground
for contesting their guilt, and that the defendant is likely to be
rewarded for a plea.20
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys learn how to plea
bargain. Prosecutors learn to dispose of the less serious cases
quickly and to stress certainty of incarceration rather than the
term of incarceration in the more serious cases. They learn to
look "beyond the defendant's guilt when evaluating a case,"
and learn "that most defendants are factually and legally
guilty."'2' Defense attorneys experience similar changes, learn-
ing that penalties are attached for being an adversary, both for
their clients and for themselves personally. As defense attor-
neys learn how to evaluate a case for plea bargaining purposes,
they develop an "impressionistic multiple regression model"
in their minds. They are surprised by the client's willingness
to plead guilty and the lenient dispositions offered by the
prosecutors, thus learning to focus their plea bargaining in seri-
ous cases on sentence bargaining so as to lessen prison time.
Heumann's information about the judges' adaptation is
much less concerned with their initial expectations, perhaps
because typically they do not bring fixed expectations to their
new jobs. Lawyers are more likely to become criminal court
judges based on their experience in the political system rather
than on actual experience in the criminal justice system; rather
than choosing their profession, they are chosen for it.24 Judges
are reactive, usually approving the plea bargain previously
agreed to by the prosecutors. During the judges' adaptation,
But Innocent Defendants? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 98-99 (1977).
20 M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 156.
2, Id. at 109.
Id. at 76. "It is a way of sorting and weighing the sundry factors that enter into
a disposition." Id.
Law students representing clients in clinical programs also are surprised by
their clients' willingness to plead guilty. Interview with Professor Marc Goldman,
Wayne State University Law School, in Detroit, Michigan (Dec. 9, 1978) (interview
conducted by telephone from Honolulu).
21 M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 128.
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Heumann shows that they too develop a belief that most defen-
dants are indeed guilty.2 The significance of this perception
lies in the development of a related judicial assumption: most
defendants ought to plead guilty. Through the course of imple-
menting this assumption, many judges come to justify engag-
ing in judicial plea bargaining, although such practice is con-
trary to American Bar Association standards.2 1 Moreover,
judges feel justified in imposing a penalty on those defendants
who unsuccessfully contest their guilt on what the judges be-
lieve21 to be a frivolous issue.
As previously stated, a major point reiterated in Plea
Bargaining is that the reality of the practice of law in the crimi-
nal justice system does not comport with newcomer expecta-
tions. Many of the people interviewed, some of the articles
quoted, and finally Heumann himself lay the blame for this
apparently unperceived dichotomy between theory and prac-
tice on the law schools. "Law school," says Heumann, "simply
does not engender a realistic perspective on the operations of
the criminal court."
To the extent that Heumann's study discovered a disen-
chantment with legal education among lawyers, 29 his interview
process failed to inquire into the defects which our legal educa-
tion suffers. Curiously, the newcomers and veterans who are so
harshly critical of their legal education seem to have taken no
efforts to supplement it. Their surprise with the reality of the
legal system seems to indicate an absence of law-clerking expe-
rience and visits to the local courts prior to their employment
2 Id. at 138.
26 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating
to Pleas of Guilty 3.3a (App. Draft 1968).
v While the judge may believe a defendant is clearly guilty, this opinion fails to
recognize that the defendant's perception of the situation (and the judge's too) is
psychologically colored by his involvement.
The judge may hold an unrealistic expectation that the defendant can be
"educated" to believe his defense is without merit by "his" defense attorney. Yet court
appointed attorneys have little credibility with defendants. See J. CASPER, supra note
6, at 105, 106 (only 20 percent of defendants with court-appointed attorneys thought
"their" lawyer was on their side). "A state attorney is worse than none" People v.
Losinger, 50 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Mich. 1951).
2 M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 153.
11 I doubt this discovery is a surprise to any group of lawyers, except, perhaps,
some law faculty members.
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as attorneys. At any rate, most practitioners have adapted to
the plea bargaining process after one year of practice in the
criminal justice system,"' although they still do not have a
conceptualized and articulated framework for their behavior.3 '
Clinical Legal Education
Quality clinical legal education seems to offer a solution to
some of the problems created by the dichotomy between the
theory and the practice of law. It would not, of course, reduce
the discrepancies between theory and practice, although it
might ease the transition between the two, and provide law
students with an experiential base during law school upon
which to dissect more effectively the theory they are studying.
A superior clinical program is dependent upon interpreted
practical experience based upon a theoretical framework. A
primary goal of clinical training should be to develop a frame-
work from which the student can analyze his or her behavior
as an attorney,32 and thereby develop a successful pattern for
future legal behavior. 33 The "interpreted" aspect of my defini-
tion refers to the use of a supervisor who can provide critical
feedback to the law student. Experience has indicated that the
greatest benefits are usually derived when the supervisor is
part of the law school faculty and is associated with an "in-
house" clinical program. Admittedly, "farm-out" or
"externship" programs do have benefits, but frequently the
supervising attorneys are so close to the heat of the battle that
they are unable to completely conceptualize the process that
they and the student are experiencing. "In-house" clinics offer
greater physical and psychological distance from practice in an
atmosphere more conducive to reflection and conceptuali-
M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 155.
I, d. at 84.
32 The model is similar to the one attributed to psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan
and known as "Participant-Observer." See A. CHAPMAN, HARRY STACK SULLIVAN: HIS
LIFE AND His WORK, 111-16 (1976). The professional engages in a relationship in which
he is both an active participant and an informed observer.
13 See Meltsner & Schrag, Report From A CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUmi. L. Rnv. 581,
584-87 (1976). A new and rich source of material for this process can be found in G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATEmALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION
IN ADvOCACY (1978).
[Vol. 68
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zation. Heumann's study supports the case for in-house clinics
by observing that newcomers in practice are seldom able to
form a consistent, coherent and systematic conceptualization
of the legal system and their own behavior within itA'
When Heumann refers to a 1967 quotation from Edward
Levi to support the proposition that law schools do a particu-
larly poor job of preparing people for criminal law careers, 5 he
may be using outdated information. Clinical legal education
programs are becoming increasingly popular. Presently, ap-
proximately ninety percent of all American Bar Association
approved law schools have such programs." In addition, of 130
law schools reporting to the Council on Legal Education and
Professional Responsibility, 110 schools reported having crimi-
nal clinical programs, and 18 additional schools reported clini-
cal programs in prisoner assistance or juvenile law. 3
CONCLUSIONS
Milton Heumann reaches the conclusion that the abolition
of plea bargaining is impossible. 8 He suggests reforms in the
plea bargaining system,39 such as putting the plea bargain in
the record, a practice which is already required in many juris-
dictions." In addition, Heumann suggests that judges explain
the reasons for a given sentence and permit appellate review of
sentences.' Some of Heumann's suggestions, most notably
those of requiring defense attorneys to state why they negoti-
ated the plea bargain and of requiring defendant participation
in plea negotiations, do not seem as appropriate.
At a time when so much is being written about plea bar-
' M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 75, 154-55.
M. HEUmANN, supra note 1, at 48.
s' Survey and Directory of Clinical Legal Education 1977-1978 vi (CLEPR, 1978).
3 Id. at 1-20.
M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 166.
' For a discussion of Heumann's proposal to require the presentation of a prima
facie case establishing the defendant's guilt and demonstrating why possible legal
challenges would be ineffective, see Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries For All Felony and
Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
88 (1977).
11 All federal courts and many states, including Connecticut, require a factual
basis for a plea. See Barkai, supra note 39, at 89 n.6; FED. R. CraM. P. 11(e)(2).
" M. HmUmNN, supra note 1, at 167.
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gaining, 2 it may be fair to ask whether we need to read any
more about the subject. For Milton Heumann's Plea
Bargaining, the answer is a resounding "yes." This book pre-
sents a ground-floor view of the legal system that, unfortun-
ately, is seldom seen. Plea Bargaining enables the reader to
understand what is popularly considered to be the adversarial
trial system, but which in actuality is a negotiation system.
Estimates are that eighty-five percent or more of all criminal
and civil cases are processed without trials.43
Plea Bargaining offers a special appeal and message to
particular audiences. Legal educators will be reminded that
unless the teaching of theory allows for a recognition of the
present state of the practice of law, graduates will feer unpre-
pared for what they thought they were trained to practice.
Judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys will be given a more
conceptualized analysis and understanding of what is happen-
ing and what did happen to them when they first entered the
courts. They may improve their plea bargaining skills by gain-
ing a better understanding of what motivates their peers, their
adversaries and themselves. Those who continue to evaluate
the criminal justice system, and the plea bargaining system in
particular, will gain greater insight into those systems by re-
viewing Mr. Heumann's analysis.
John Barkai*
12 Other recent plea bargaining books include J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING & GUILTY
PLEAS (1975); H. MILLER, W. McDONALD, AND J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE
UNITED STATES (1978), and A. Rossrr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE By CONSENT (1976); P.
UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS (1978). There are numerous articles on the subject of plea
bargaining; see, e.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 3
(1978); Wilson, Fifth Amendment and the Guilty Plea: An Incompatible Association,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1979); and Comment, New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e): Dangers in Restricting the Judicial Role in Sentencing Agreements, 14 AMt. CraM.
L. REV. 305 (1976). An entire issue of Law & Society Review is devoted to plea bargain-
ing. See 11 LAW & Soc'y REV., No. 2 (1979).
11 See R. FIGG, CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 319 (1974); ABA Project on Minimum Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 1-2 (App. Draft
1968); The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, Task Force Report: The Courts 9 (1967).
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